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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LARAE JENSEN nka LARAE THORPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 900372-CA
vs.
RAYMOND JENSEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this
matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(h) Utah Code Ann. (1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether the trial court's findings and

conclusions are based on appropriate factors.

This issue

presents a question of law and requires the appellate court to
review the lower court's decision without according deference
thereto.

Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1977).
B.

Whether the trial court's findings and

conclusions supporting the initial custody award are supported
by the evidence.

This issue presents a question of fact and

requires the appellate court to review the lower court's
decision applying the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).

C.

Whether the trial court improperly failed to

consider the changed circumstances of the noncustodial parent
as well as the custodial parent.

This issue presents a

question of law and requires the appellate court to review the
lower court's decision without according deference thereto.
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989).
D.

Whether the petitioner established substantial

change of circumstances to allow the trial court to reconsider
the issue of custody.

This issue requires the appellate court

to uphold the lower court's decision absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion or manifest injustice.

Maughan v. Maughan,

770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a Supplemental Order of the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sevier County, Honorable Don
V. Tibbs, Denying and Reaffirming Plaintiff's Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce as to Jamie Christina Jensen and Josie
McKele Jensen and the Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

This matter was originally appealed to

this Court under Case No. 870513-CA.

This Court remanded the

case, and the actions of the District Court after the remand
are the subject of this appeal.
Statement of Facts
A.

Plaintiff LaRae Jensen and Defendant Raymond

Jensen, were married on September 27, 1979.
-2-

Three children

were born to the parties during the course of the marriage and
Raymond adopted LaRae's two children from a previous marriage.
(R, T-3, p. 11, 19-20; R, T-2, p. 7).
B.

The parties filed for divorce and a Decree of

Divorce was entered on February 10, 1987.

(R, T-2, p. 15).

The Decree awarded Raymond custody of all five children subject
to LaRae's right to reasonable visitation.

The Decree also

contained a provision that the District Court would review the
custody order after 90 days in the event that the two older
children filed written elections requesting that LaRae assume
custody of them.

(R, 60-62).

The District Court failed to

enter Findings and Conclusions supporting the custody award.
C. I After the Decree was signed, LaRae took all five
children to visit their grandparents.

During the visit, one of

the children was struck and killed by an automobile.

From

February until June of 1987, Raymond allowed LaRae to take
physical custody of the youngest child.

During this same

period of time, the two older children went to live with LaRae
and filed elections to remain in her custody.
D.|

(R, p. 241-242).

In June of 1987, LaRae filed an affidavit seeking

custody of all four children, and child support.

She argued in

her affidavit that the following factors established a change
of circumstances:
(1) she had physical custody of three of the
four children;
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(2) the children in her custody had established
ties to their new community;
(3) she had remarried, was working part-time,
and was financially secure;
(4) the child in Raymond's custody was separated
from her siblings, was unhappy, and lacked parental
supervision;
(5) Raymond failed to arrange visitation with
the children in her custody;
(6) Raymond had failed to assist her financially
with the support of the children in her custody; and
(7) Raymond was using the children to manipulate
her.
(R, p. 71-76).
E.

Both parties presented evidence at a hearing on

September 30, 1987.

The District Court ruled from the bench

that LaRae had failed to establish a material change of
circumstances.
F.

(R, T-2).

An Order was entered on October 19, 1987,

amending the decree to award LaRae custody of the two older
children.

The Order also denied LaRae's petition to gain

custody of the other children.

(R, p.

117-118).

Once again,

the District Court failed to enter findings to support its
decision.

LaRae appealed the District Court's decision.
G.

On June 1, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued

a decision vacating the Order Denying Plaintiff's Petition to
Modify and remanding the case for entry of appropriate findings
for both the initial award of custody and the Order Denying
Modification.

(Addendum, A-l).

-4-

H.

On or about March 14, 1990, Supplemental Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed with the District
Court by defendant's attorney.

Plaintiff filed an objection to

the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
hearing was held on May 16, 1990 for the purpose of settling
the Findings of Fact.

Supplemental Findings were executed and

entered by the District Court on June 5, 1990 and the
Supplemental Order was entered on July 11, 1990.
235-244; 247-248).

(R, p.

It is from this Order that plaintiff

appealjs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court's Supplemental Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law do not comply with the directives of
this Court on remand of this matter nor do they comply with the
requirements of well-established Utah case law.

They fail to

address the specific factors pertinent to the District Court's
decision and do not address the particular needs of each child
or the ability of each parent to meet those needs.

The

Findings are not sufficiently detailed, do not indicate that
the District Court's process in reaching its custody
determination was logical and properly supported and, in many
instances, are clearly erroneous.

The failure of the trial

court to make findings on all material issues is reversible
error because the facts in the record are not "clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
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favor of the [District Court's] judgment."
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).

Acton v. Deliran,

The Court's Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law are colored by bias towards women
pursuing other than the traditional role of homemaker and rely,
almost exclusively, on factors which this Court has held are
improper for consideration in a custody dispute.
The District Court's Supplemental Findings relating to
the modification hearing of September 30, 1987 do not compare
the evidence presented at the modification hearing with the
factors underlying the District Court's original award and,
therefore, ignore this Court's directive on remand.

The

modification hearing findings fail to address the best
interests of the children or the changed circumstances asserted
by the appellant.

The Supplemental Findings and Conclusions,

instead, appear to be based on the District Court's concept
that the appellant was at fault for the failure of the marriage
and that she was not entitled to custody because of her past
moral indiscretions.
An examination of the factors set forth in Hutchison
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), establishes that
appellant met both parts of the test as set forth in Elmer v.
Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), and that the District Court's
denial of appellant's Petition for Modification constitutes an
abuse of discretion.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE NOT PROPERLY BASED UPON APPROPRIATE FACTORS
AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
A.

Findings of Fact:

Original Custody Determination.

On remand, this Court instructed the District Court to
enter appropriate findings and that:
Those findings should articulate the
considerations behind the initial award of
custody and the order denying modification,
and should reflect the current legal
standard for modification of custody.
(Page 5 of the Court's Opinion, Item 1 in the Addendum).

An

examination of the District Court's Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereafter "Findings and
Conclusions") reveals that it failed to comply with the
appellate court directive on remand.
The Findings and Conclusions eventually entered by the
District Court fall far short of the standard set by the Utah
Supreme Court and this Court.

The Utah Supreme Court has held:

. . . a custody decision must be supported
by written findings and conclusions. These
findings should refer to the specific
factors pertinent to the decision of what
placement is in the best interests of the
child, "including the particular needs of
[each] child and the ability of each parent
to meet those needs." (citation omitted)
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1987).
has held that:

-7-

This Court

A custody award must be firmly anchored on
findings of fact that (1) are sufficiently
detailed, (2) include enough facts to
disclose the process through which the
ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) indicate
the process is logical and properly
supported, and (4) are not clearly
erroneous. (citations omitted) If this is
not accomplished by the trial court, the
issue of custody must be reversed unless the
record itself supports the award to the
standard reiterated in Acton.
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987).

In

Marchant, this court cited the standard reiterated in Acton v.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987):
Failure of the trial court to make findings
on all material issues is reversible error
unless the facts in the record are "clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment."
A review of the District Court's Findings and
Conclusions reveals that they do not meet the standards which
the appellate courts of this state have held are applicable to
findings and conclusions in child custody disputes.

The

Findings and Conclusions are not sufficiently detailed and do
not include enough facts to disclose a legitimate process
through which the District Court reached its ultimate
conclusion.

To the contrary, the Findings and ultimate

Conclusions in this matter are the result of the District
Court's concentration on factors which this Court has held are
improper.

The Findings and Conclusions are not the product of

a process which is logical and properly supported.
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The Findings of Fact are subject to the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review.

The conclusions derived

therefrom, however, and the determination of whether the
Findings and Conclusions are based on appropriate factors is a
question of law and requires the appellate court to review the
lower court's decision without granting deference thereto.
Marchant, supra, at 203.
The record reflects that the trial court had
difficulty with its task on remand.

Addressing the appellant's

attorney, the District Court inquired:
What I'd like to know is do you feel that
the court of appeals meant for me to go back
and rehear this case? Or do you feel they
just meant for me to make some findings,
based upon my original order?
(R, T-4, p. 5). The trial court was at a loss as to how to
proceed and clearly relied heavily upon the input and
assistance of respondent's attorney in completing the Findings
which were eventually entered.

(R, T-4, p. 5). In determining

how to proceed in the hearing on appellant's Objections to the
respondent's Proposed Supplemental Findings ("Findings
Hearing"), the District Court stated:
Well, why don't we just go by paragraph by
paragraph [of the respondent's proposed
supplemental findings] and let's just go
that way and you show me where, in the
finding, upon what you based it.
I think I remember the case because it was
an unusual case. It will probably come back
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to me. Right now I'm having a little hard
time remembering it, but I do remember it
was quite an unusual case.
So why don't we just start and we'll go step
by step through this supplemental findings
and then I'll refer to your objection and
then we'll see where he basis [sic] it in
the record; All right?
(R, T-4, p. 6). The Findings and Conclusions which were
eventually entered are a product of the bias of the
respondent's attorney and the District Court's fading memory of
the original custody hearing.

The hearing transcript contains

virtually no specific reference by either the District Court or
respondent's attorney to the trial record.
In the Findings Hearing, appellant's counsel objected
to respondent's proposed Finding No. 5 because the Finding
failed to define which parent was the primary caretaker.
Appellant's counsel argued that the factors set forth in Pusey
v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), needed to be considered.
The Pusey factors were never addressed and apparently never
considered by the District Court.

Finding No. 5 was, pursuant

to appellant's objection, modified to state that Mr. Jensen:
Was the primary caretaker of the children
after plaintiff (LaRae) became actively
involved in the ambulance program; that
defendant was working in his own business,
but was also taking care of the children;
that the plaintiff found interests outside
of the home and defendant had become the
primary caretaker of the children.
(R, 238).
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Finding No. 5 reveals the District Court's basic,
underlying motive and grounds for awarding custody of the
children to respondent:
outside of the home.

the appellant had found interests

On that basis, the District Court

determined that the defendant had become the primary caretaker
of the children despite its recognition that defendant, too,
was working outside of the home.

This Court has stated that it

will not:
Condone any finding of fact which might be
interpreted as penalizing a woman for
acquiring skills in other than the most
fundamental and traditional areas necessary
for functioning as a wife and mother.
Marchant, supra, at 204.
This bias towards women pursuing other than the
traditional role of homemaker permeates the District Court's
findings.

Finding No. 6, for example, states that appellant

placed her personal interests ahead of those of the family to
the extent that she neglected the family "undermined the home,
caused turmoil and dissention, . . ." (R, 238). Finding No. 6
shows that the District Court, to a great extent, "based its
conclusion that defendant was the proper custodial parent on
the outmoded concept of fault on the part of plaintiff."
Marchant, supra, at 203. At the conclusion of the divorce
trial, after the District Court had granted custody of the
children to respondent, the District Court made this
statement:

"The plaintiff, I realize this is not what she
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contemplated.
herself.M

That I can't help, because she brought it upon

(R, T-3, p. 205).
Finding No. 6 is objectionable on other grounds as

well.

The District Court's conclusion is contrary to the

testimony heard by the District Court, in particular as the
testimony relates to the Findings in the subparts of Finding
No. 6.

For example, in subparagraph (A) the District Court

held that:

"LaRae developed a pre-occupying interest in a

Sevier County ambulance program . . . .M

(R, 238). While the

evidence established that LaRae volunteered on a regular basis
for the Sevier County Ambulance Program, there was no evidence
before the District Court to establish that her commitment to
the program was "pre-occupying."
Additionally, the evidence before the District Court
was uncontroverted that while LaRae may have been experiencing
difficulty in her marriage, she was at all times a loving,
caring mother who spent time with all of her children and
provided for their needs.

(R, T-3, p. 21-29; 56-58; 80, 83;

87-88) .
In Finding No. 6(B), the District Court found that
LaRae*s interest in the ambulance program was to the exclusion
of her family welfare and that she "was gone for periods of
time on most days" and that "she did not make adequate
provision for the children while she was gone."

(R, 238).

Again, the District Court's bias against women pursuing
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interests outside of the home is evident.

Furthermore, LaRae's

work with the ambulance program was not to the exclusion of her
family's welfare.

The fact that both the District Court and

the defendant deemed it LaRae's responsibility to make
provisions for the care of the children in her absence
contradicts the District Court's finding that defendant was the
primary caretaker and establishes that, during the course of
their marriage, both parties looked upon LaRae as the primary
caretaker.

The responsibility for the children's care

ultimately fell to her.
In Pusey, supra, at 120 , the Supreme Court wrote that
the choice in "competing child custody claims" should be based
on "function-related factors."

One of the most prominent

factors which must be considered is "the identity of the
primary caretaker during the marriage."

While the evidence

tended to establish that respondent assisted in the care of the
children, it is apparent that, at least as far as the parties
were concerned, appellant had the identity of primary
caretaker.

There is never any mention by the District Court

that, during the term of his marriage to appellant, respondent
shared in the responsibility of arranging babysitters or child
care for the children.

Instead, any reference to respondent's

care of the children is in terms of Raymond doing LaRae's job.
Conspicuously absent from the District Court's Findings and
Conclusions is any reference to the evidence that the

-13-

respondent was often at his place of business from before 7:00
a.m. until past 10:00 p.m. and that, on most days, he was at
work until at least after 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening. (R, T-2,
p. 58). There is no evidence that the respondent ever
concerned himself with arranging for babysitters for the
children because of his daily absence from the home.
In Finding 6(c), the District Court found, among other
things, that "while working in the ambulance program [LaRae]
took extended trips with male members of the ambulance crew.
She had an intimate affair with Randy Thorpe. . . . "
239).

(R,

At the time this Finding was entered, there was no

evidence before the District Court that LaRae took extended
trips with male members of the ambulance crew.

While the

District Court heard some evidence that LaRae spent some time
at the home of Randy Thorpe, there was absolutely no evidence
supporting the District Court's finding that she had an
"intimate affair" with him.

Both LaRae Jensen and Randy Thorpe

testified that their relationship was not an "intimate
affair."

(R, T-3, p. 42-43; 190-191).
In the same Finding, the District Court found that

LaRae had "elected" to have a baby by an individual named John
Bergin.

(R, 239). This Finding is particularly interesting in

light of the Order and Findings which the District Court made
from the bench.

Regarding that child, the District Court

stated that:

-14-

It is the order of this court that this
court so finds that this is a child of this
marriage period. This child was born under
the marriage contract while these parties
were married. This is the child of the
defendant, as well as the child of the
plaintiff. That is the order of the court.
There will be no more discussion concerning
it not being the child. If it's brought to
my intention that there's any discussion,
from either of the parties, to these
children, contrary, I will consider that a
contempt to this court and will use my
authority to punish by jail.
(R, T-3, p. 205).
It is evident from the tenor of the District Court's
findings that it placed an improperly high emphasis on
appellant's moral character in reaching its custody
determination.

The Utah Supreme Court has held:

[A] determination of the children's best
interest turns on numerous factors, each of
which may vary in importance according to
the facts in a particular case. Moral
character is only one of a myriad of factors
the court may properly consider in
determining a child's best interests. In
this regard we have previously held that a
parent's extra-marital sexual relationship
alone is insufficient to justify a change in
custody.
Sanderson v. Tryon, supra, at 627.
The District Court's Finding, issued from the bench,
illustrates that the appellant's moral character and her
interests outside of the home were the primary factors behind
the original custody determination.

-15-

The District Court stated:

After hearing all this evidence, I'm not
convinced that it's for the best interest of
the children that they be awarded to the
plaintiff. I do that with difficulty
because she's the mother. But no longer can
I just award children to the mother when she
can completely sissy [sic] disobeys and goes
contrary to the rules of society.
(R, T-3, p. 203).
The extent to which the District Court would deprive
appellant of the right to have any interests whatsoever outside
of the home is illustrated by its Finding No. 6(D). In that
Finding, the District Court found that the appellant "acquired
a horse for her personal use which took more time from
family."

(R, 239). This Finding should not have been a factor

in the District Court's custody determination.
supra, at 204.

See, Marchant,

The District Court would condemn appellant for

having any interests outside of the home, even though the
evidence established that, while LaRae experienced difficulty
in her marriage and developed personal interests, she was at
all times a loving, caring mother who spent time with all of
her children and provided for all of their needs.
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed the standard upon
which judicial custody determinations must be based:
[A] judicial determination of custody based
on the child's best interests is based on an
objective and impartial comparison of the
parenting skills, character, and abilities
of both parents in light of a realistic and
objective appraisal of the needs of a child.
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Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989).

The Findings and

Conclusions are void of any impartial comparison of parenting
skills or objective appraisal of the children's needs.

The

District Court's focus, instead, is on disciplining the
"wayward wife.M
B.

Supplemental Findings:
9/30/87.

Modification Hearing

The District Court's Findings and Conclusions relating
to the Modification Hearing, held September 30, 1987, are
equally inadequate and flawed.

Significantly, while it makes

brief reference to the material changes and circumstances
alleged by appellant, none of the District Court's Findings
address any of those issues or factors.

In Finding No. 13 of

the Supplemental Findings, the District Court concludes,
without indicating the steps by which it reached its ultimate
conclusion and without addressing the factors raised by the
appellant, that no changed conditions had been shown with
regard to either the respondent or with regard to the
appellant.

(R, p. 243). In its opinion remanding this matter,

this Court commented that:
Other than an unsigned statement by the
court that Raymond is still the primary
caretaker, the trial court's order neither
discusses LaRae's evidence in support of her
affidavit, nor compares that evidence with
the factors underlying the original award.
(Opinion, p. 4).
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In addition to failing to address the changed
conditions alleged by appellant, the District Court made
Findings and Conclusions contrary to and unsupported by the
evidence.

After the divorce, one of the parties' children,

Savannah, was killed when she was struck by a car.

In its

Finding No. 4, the District Court found that Savannah's death
was a factor which caused respondent to "permit" the
appellant's parents to assume custody of the minor child,
Josie.

This Finding is contrary to the evidence which

establishes that Raymond gave LaRae custody of Josie in
February, before Savannah's death.

(R, T-2, p. 16-17).

Based

on Raymond's own testimony, he was experiencing difficulty with
the two older children, Shalauna and Stacey.
and 69).

(R, T-2, p. 68

Raymond told LaRae to pick the children up, including

the baby, because he couldn't cope with them.

(R, T-2, p. 16).

The District Court heard uncontroverted testimony that
Raymond also asked Mr. and Mrs. Robert Proctor, appellant's
parents, to take permanent custody of Josie.
and 72).

(R, T-2, p. 41

Raymond knew at all times that LaRae actually had

custody of Josie.

(R, T-2, p. 72-73).

The District Court's

Finding on this matter does not recognize any of these critical
factors which were established by the evidence.
Finding No. 7 of the Supplemental Findings is
similarly flawed.

In this Finding, the District Court states

that "the temporary arrangement was terminated by Raymond.
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The

grandparents had allowed LaRae to take care of Josie and LaRae
refused to return the child to Raymond."

This Finding implies

that Raymond terminated the arrangement when he learned LaRae
had custody of the child.

Raymond testified that he knew where

the baby was during the four months LaRae had custody of her.
(R, T-2, p. 73). The evidence before the District Court
established that, following Savannah's death, Raymond was
willing to allow the Proctors' to take custody of Josie and
attempted to have LaRae sign an agreement to that effect.

When

LaRae refused to sign the agreement, Raymond demanded that
LaRae return Josie to his custody.
30).

(R, T-2, p. 73; 38-41;

Finding No. 7, therefore, is directly contrary to the

evidence, including respondent's own testimony.
In Finding No. 9 of the Supplemental Findings, the
District Court found that "since June of 1987 the children have
been well cared for and are making a good adjustment."
242).

(R, p.

Contrary to the requirements established by this Court

and the Utah Supreme Court, this Finding contains no detail and
absolutely no subsidiary facts to provide any hint of how the
District Court reached this Finding.

None of the points raised

by LaRae were discussed or addressed by the District Court.
The Findings even fail to make even the briefest mention of the
nature of the circumstances and conditions in the home of the
custodial parent.

This Finding, while apparentlv critical to
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the District Court's determination, fails to meet the standard
required in Smith and Marchant, supra.
The testimony of Hilda Gentry, a witness who refused
to testify for the plaintiff except under subpoena, established
that the minor child, Jamie, a 7 year old, spent hours every
week at a Conoco gas station/mini-store.

Ms. Gentry testified

that the store is near a busy highway and that Jamie would ride
her bike down to the store at night, three to four times a
week, although Raymond had never made arrangements with her to
watch the child.

According to Ms. Gentry, when she began

working the day shift, Jamie was still spending substantial
amounts of time at the store in the evenings.
so much that the owners became upset.

Jamie was there

(R, T-2, p. 46-55).

Another witness testified that she would see Jamie
riding her bike after dark, approximately a mile out of town.
(R, T-2, p. 58). The same witness testified that she would see
Raymond in his shop working as late as 10:00 p.m. and Saturdays
as well.

(R, T-2, p. 58, 61).
Additionally, the evidence before the District Court

directly controverted the District Court's statement that the
children were making a good adjustment.

Raymond Jensen's

testimony established that Jamie missed her mother and older
siblings, and was having problems at school.

(R, T-2, p. 85).

Josie spent significant amounts of time with babysitters and
experienced difficulty in potty training (R, T-2, p. 58, 61;
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83-84, 93). The facts illustrate the inaccuracy of Finding No.
10 that, "LaRae did not show a substantial and material change
effecting [sic] Raymond's parenting ability which would justify
reopening the custody question."

(R, 242-243)).

In Finding No. 11 the District Court states that:
Josie was out of Raymond's care for a period
of about three months. A part of the period
resulted from LaRae's refusal to return the
child. The visitation with the grandparents
was intended to help resolve the emotion and
traumatic problems facing all the parties
because of the death of Savannah.
(R, 243).
Contrary to the District Court's Finding, the evidence
established that Josie was out of Raymond's care for at least
four months.

(R, T-2, p. 16-17; 41; 73-73).

Additionally,

Raymond testified that when he went to pick up Josie he was
able to take her.

(R, T-2, p. 86). The District Court also

erred in implying in this Finding that the visitation was meant
to be with the grandparents when Raymond testified that he knew
Josie was with her mother.

(R, T-2, p. 73).

Finally, the District Court found in Findings No. 13
and 14 that there were no changed conditions with regard to
Raymond or LaRae.

It made these Findings without addressing,

even superficially, the points raised in LaRae's affidavit
alleging the changed circumstances upon which her Petition
relied.

Nor did the District Court address the testimony of

witnesses establishing that Raymond's long working hours, among
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other things, resulted in an unstable situation for the
children whose desire it has been to be reunited with their
mother and older siblings.

(R, T-2, p. 72, 85).

The Findings and Conclusions entered by the District
Court after remand by this Court lack sufficient detail and
facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate
conclusion was reached.

There is no indication that the

District Court's decision process was logical and properly
supported.

In fact, the evidence establishes that a number of

the District Court's Findings and Conclusions are clearly
erroneous.

They are also contrary to law because they are

based on improper factors including the District Court's belief
that a woman's place is in the home and that any moral
indiscretion makes a parent unfit to have custody of her
children.
POINT II
APPELLANT ESTABLISHED MATERIAL CHANGES IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL
CUSTODY AWARD WAS BASED AND THE DENIAL OF HER PETITION
FOR MODIFICATION CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Apply the Applicable
Legal Standard in Denying Appellant's Petition
for Modification.

In the opinion remanding this matter, this Court
directed the trial court that its Findings and Conclusions
"should articulate the consideration behind the initial award
of custody and the Order denying modification, and should
reflect the current legal standard for modification of
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custody."

Opinion, p. 5.

The trial court's Findings relevant

to the Petition for Modification do not articulate the
considerations behind the initial award of custody and the
Order denying modification.

There is also no indication that

the trial court applied the current legal standard as directed
by this Court.

This Court instructed the trial court that its

Findings and Conclusions must reflect the current legal
standard as set forth in Elmer v. Elmer, supra.
Elmer sets out a two-part test which must be applied
in determining the changed-circumstances issue.

In setting

forth that two-part test, the court relied on the language of
Hoqqe v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982):
Hogge held that a parent seeking a change in
custody of a child must first establish that
there has been a substantial and material
change in the circumstances upon which the
original custody award was based, and second
and thereafter, that a change in custody is
in the best interests of the child.
Elmer at 602.

The Elmer court also held that:

[W]e have held that a change in the
circumstances of the noncustodial parent may
bear upon the issue of whether a change of
custody may be appropriate. (Citation
omitted.)
The Findings and Conclusions do not address, even
superficially, the material changes asserted by the appellant
in her Petition.

In her affidavit supporting her Petition for

Modification, she attested to the following material changes
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having taken place in her life and in the conditions under
which her two youngest children, those in Raymond's custody,
were living;
-

Since the entry of the decree of divorce, LaRae
had had physical custody of the minor daughter,
Josie, for six months and custody of Shalauna and
Stacey for almost the entire period;

-

She had obtained full-time employment and her
work schedule allowed her to attend to the
children's needs in the mornings before school
and to be home when they arrive home from school
in the afternoon.

Her husband and parents were

available to assist in the care of the children
in LaRae's absence;
-

Since the divorce, LaRae had married a man with a
stable job with the State of Utah and had built a
stable relationship;

-

The minor daughter, Jamie, had been separated
from her mother, grandparents, and siblings for
nearly six months and had indicated a strong
desire to be reunited and live with her mother
and siblings.

Jamie had indicated a dislike of

living alone with her father;
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;-

The father's work schedule kept him away from
home long hours each day and, as a result, Jamie,
then 7 years old, was left without supervision
for more than two hours each evening;

-.

Raymond attempted to obtain LaRae*s signature on
documents which would have potentially
relinquished her parental rights.

(R, 100-104).

The District Court did not even address the issues
l •

raised by LaRae in her affidavit or the testimony of witnesses
that Jamie would spend long periods hanging out at a Conoco gas
station/mini-store, including hours after dark.
46-55).

(R, T-2, p.

Other evidence, discussed in Point I above, that Jamie

would be seen riding her bike after dark approximately a mile
out-of-town, that Raymond would work in his shop as late as
10:00 p.m. and on Saturdays, and that the youngest child,
Josie, spent significant amounts of time with various and
sundry babysitters was also not addressed.
The District Court did not discuss or address the
crucial factors raised by LaRae, but nevertheless found that
she had failed to establish that there had been a material
change in the circumstances upon which the original custody
award was based.

The District Court's Supplemental Findings

and Conclusions fail to find or conclude that the best
interests of Jamie and Josie would be served by modifying the
custody Order.

Apparently, the District Court did not look
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beyond the improper factors upon which it had based its
original Order.

In the Order and Findings issued by the

District Court from the bench in the Order to Show Cause
hearing, that Court stated:
I just frankly am not convinced there's a
material change of circumstances and I
recognize the fact that there is an
advantage for your children being together
and that's one reason I made the decision
like I did to start with. But I just feel
that Mr. Jensen's done all he possibly could
do to take care of these children, and I
recognize it's all not glorious and there's
been problems. It would just seem to me
that if I found a material change of
circumstances, it's because she now marries
the guy that she has the situation develop
with and it would just be creating a real
problem and I find that Mr. Jensen is still
the primary caretaker of these children and
that the children should remain with him.
(Emphasis added.) (R, T-2, p. 115.)
The District Court, inexplicably, does not address any of the
factors raised by LaRae, and yet considers pre-divorce
conditions (LaRae's alleged "relationship" with Randy Thorpe),
which has substantially changed due to LaRae's marriage.

The

District Court also based its determination on its Finding that
Mr. Jensen was still the primary caretaker of Jamie and Josie.
As the District Court had granted Mr. Jensen sole custody of
those two children in the original decree, this Finding is
irrelevant to the material issues before the Court on LaRae1s
Petition.
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B.

The Material Changes Established by Appellant's
Evidence Require a Modification of the Decree of
Divorce to Award Custody of All of the Minor
Children to Appellant.

A review of the evidence ignored by the District
Court, and applicable standards as expressed in the case law of
this State, establish that the District Court's denial of
appellant's Petition for Modification should be reversed and
that this Court should order that appellant's Petition be
granted.
In Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982),
the Utah Supreme Court set forth certain relevant factors which
are relevant in determining a child's best interests.
Some factors the court may consider in
determining the child's best interests
relate primarily to the child's feelings or
special needs: the preference of the child;
keeping siblings together; the relative
strength of the child's bond with one or
both of the prospective custodians, and, in
appropriate cases, the general interest in
continuing previously determined custody
arrangements where the child is happy and
well-adjusted. Other factors relate
primarily to the prospective custodians'
character or status or to their capacity or
willingness to function as parents: moral
character and emotional stability; duration
and depth of desire for custody; ability to
provide personal rather than surrogate care;
significant impairment of ability to
function as a parent through drug abuse,
excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons
for having relinquished custody in the past;
religious compatibility with the child;
kinship, including, in extraordinary
circumstances, step-parent status; and
financial condition.
Hutchison at 41.
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A review of these factors reveals that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying appellant's Petition for
Modification.
There was incontroverted evidence of the minor
daughter Jamie's strong preference to be with her mother and
two older siblings.

In his own testimony, Raymond Jensen

admitted Jamie's strong desire to be with her mother and
siblings and her unhappiness at being kept separate from them.
Q.

And you also testified, did you not,
that at the little luncheon after the
funeral that Jamie ran to her mother
and said, "I want to be with my mom,"
or "I want to be with LaRae," or
something to that effect?

A,

That's correct.

Q.

Has [Jamie] ever told you that at any
other time?

A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Okay. Did she ever talk to you about
wanting to be with Stacey and Shalauna,
spend time with them?

A.

I'm sure she has. Yeah.

Q.

Okay. Now isn't it true that in the
month of February you let LaRae take
Josie?

A.

That's true.

Q.

And that she had her for a continuous
period of time, from early February
until June 19th, when you went with the
police and took Josie from her at
Pleasant Grove?

A.

That's correct.
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Q.

Okay. Now, you testified that when you
called and says [sic], "I'm coming to
get her," that she gave you some run
around and said, "we might not be here"
that sort of thing?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But when you did go to get her, she
was, in fact, in the home and you were
able to get the children.

A.

She wasn't there that I could see.
Shalauna was the only one that I could
see there.

Q.

But you were able to get the children
that day, weren't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you went home with her, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now did Jamie put up a fuss at that
time and didn't want to go with you?

A.

She didn't want to go too bad.

(R, T-2, p. 85-86).

Other signs of Jamie's unhappiness and

loneliness are evident in the amount of time she spent just
hanging around the Conoco station/mini-store.
This Court stated in its Opinion remanding this matter
for the entry of Findings and Conclusions that:
The hearing transcript reveals that keeping
the children together was one reason for
awarding initial custody to the father, but
there is nothing to indicate why the court
dispensed with that objective in awarding
custody of only the older children to LaRae.
(Opinion, p. 4). The District Court addresses the importance
of keeping the children together in its Findings of Fact
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relating to the original divorce trial.

In its Supplemental

Findings on the hearing to modify, however, there is no mention
by the Court of the importance of keeping the children
together.

There is still, therefore, "nothing to indicate why

the Court dispensed with that objective in awarding custody of
only the older children to LaRae."

The District Court was

concerned with the difficulty Raymond would have in controlling
the two older children if they were forced to stay with him
against their will, but does not consider the impact which
separating the children would have on the children.

The

District Court fails to acknowledge the ties between the
children which may, in fact, be stronger than their ties to
their father.

Jamie, it was shown, was very unhappy being

separated from her siblings.
The testimony, as discussed above, is uncontroverted
that the strength of Jamie's bond to her mother is much
stronger and compelling than her bond to her father.

This

conclusion does not ignore the fact that Jamie certainly loves
her father and knows that he loves her.

That love, however,

cannot overcome her sense of loss at being separated from her
mother and siblings.

Josie, naturally, was too young to voice

any kind of preference or signify with which parent she had the
strongest bond.

Critical to the determination of Josie's

custody and best interests is the fact that Raymond is not, in
all likelihood, her biological father.
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The District Court

found that LaRae had "elected to have a baby by [John
Bergin].M

(R, p. 238.)

LaRae testified that, because of

Raymond's sexual preference, that she doubted very much that
Josie was Raymond's child.

(R, T-3, p. 20.)

The District

Court's Finding and Order that Josie was a child of the
marriage and the child of Raymond cannot alter the biological
reality.
The final factor set forth in Hutchison relating to
the child's feelings or special needs regards the general
interest in continuing a custody arrangement where the child is
happy and well-adjusted.
case.

There was no such interest in this

The evidence, as discussed above, was uncontroverted

that Jamie was not happy or well-adjusted.

There was also

testimony to the effect that the youngest child, Josie, was
experiencing adjustment problems because of the significant
amounts of time which she was spending with babysitters.

(R,

T-2, p. 58, 61; 83-84, 93).
Another factor, the moral character and emotional
stability of the parties was also not considered by the trial
court and favors the awarding of custody to the appellant.

The

trial court obviously felt that Raymond's activity in the LDS
Church was an important factor in determining who should be
granted custody of the children in the original decree.
(Finding 5C; R, 237). The District Court continued to weigh
heavily LaRae's pre-divorce moral indiscretions without
considering her change of circumstances.
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The facts presented by LaRae showed that she was
happily married in a monogamous relationship with a man who
apparently provided her much greater support than she had
received from Raymond during the course of her marriage to
him.

Had the trial court been interested in looking at the

factors presented by LaRae objectively, it would have seen that
her marriage and home life at that time constituted a material
and significant change from her situation immediately following
the divorce and afforded a much more stable environment to the
children than Raymond could offer.
The duration and depth of LaRae's desire for custody
of all of her children cannot be disputed.

She fought hard for

custody during the divorce trial and has been fighting to
obtain that custody ever since.

LaRae also provided

uncontroverted testimony to the Court regarding her ability to
provide personal rather than surrogate care for Jamie and
Josie.

As appellant has discussed above, LaRae testified that

she had the ability to be with the children both before and
after school and that her work schedule was flexible.

The

testimony, as discussed above, showed that Raymond, on the
other hand, worked very long hours, relied on babysitters
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extensively, and left Jamie to seek her own unsupervised
diversions.
This Court found, in its Opinion remanding this
matter, that Raymond permitted LaRae to assume physical custody
of Josie from February 1987 through June 1987.

Testimony also

showed that Raymond attempted to relinquish custody of Josie
permanently to LaRae's parents.

This Court stated in its

earlier Opinion on this matter that without proper findings "it
is difficult to distinguish Raymond's voluntary relinquishment
of custody to LaRae from the situation in

The District Court's

Findings and Conclusions show that there is no distinction
between Raymond's relinquishment of custody and the situation
in Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982).
mother left her children in her mother's care.

In Tuckey, the
The

grandmother, in her daughter's absence, relinquished the
children to their paternal grandparents.

In that case the

court held that:
The conduct of the mother, coupled with the
defendant's mother's release of the children
to the paternal grandparents, and the events
resulting from that act, clearly constitute
a sufficient change in circumstance to
warrant reconsideration of the custody issue
in this instance.
Tuckey at 90.

Despite this principle of law, the District

Court found that there were no material changes in
circumstances to warrant reconsideration of its earlier custody
determination.
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Finally, there was a substantial change in LaRae's
financial condition from the time of the divorce to the time of
her Petition.
and alone.

At the time of the divorce, she was unemployed

At the time of the Petition, on the other hand, she

was married to a husband who had good, stable employment with
the State of Utah and was herself employed.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's Findings and Conclusions are
woefully inadequate and fail to comply with this Court's direct
instructions given to the District Court on Remand.

The

Findings and Conclusions are clearly erroneous and the District
Court's order denying appellant's petition must be reversed.
Marchant, supra, at 203.
The examination of the above factors establish that
LaRae met both requirements of the Elmer test and that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying her Petition for
Modification.
real.

The change in circumstances was substantial and

The best interests of the children require that they be

reunited with their mother and siblings.

This Court should

reverse the District Court's denial of appellant's Petition and
Order that custody of all of the children be granted to appellant
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BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals the denial of her petition to modify a
divorce decree awarding custody of her minor children to their
father. We vacate the order and remand for appropriate findings.
Plaintiff LaRae Jensen and defendant Raymond Jensen were
married on September 27, 1979, and divorced on February 10,
1987. During the course of their marriage, the parties had
three children, and Raymond adopted two of LaRae's children from
a previous marriage. The divorce decree awarded Raymond custody
of all five children subject to reasonable visitation by LaRae.
The court also determined to review the custody order at the end
of ninety days if the two oldest children filed written
elections to have Larae assume custody of them.
The day after the divorce decree was signed, LaRae took all
five children to visit with her parents. During the visit, the
second youngest child was struck and killed by an automobile.
Raymond then permitted LaRae to assume physical custody of the
youngest child from February until June of 1987. The two older
children also went to live with LaRae and timely filed the
written elections contemplated by the court in the divorce
decree.

decree was amended to award custody of the two older children to
LaRae. The court stated that no finding of a change of
circumstances was required because the court had previously
reserved the option to amend the divorce decree in this manner.
In the next paragraph, the court denied LaRae's -petition- to
gain custody of all the children. No findings were made
regarding this aspect of the trial court's order. LaRae appeals
only from that portion of the order.
Trial courts are given broad discretion in making custody
determinations, and those decisions will not be upset on appeal
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion or manifest
injustice. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App.
1989). This discretion must be -exercised within the confines
of the legal standards set by appellate courts, and the facts
and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth in
findings and conclusions.- i£. The importance of proper
findings was emphasized in Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426
(Utah 1986) (citation omitted):
To ensure that the trial court's custody
determination, discretionary as it is, . . .
is rationally based, it is essential that
the court set forth in its findings of fact
not only that it finds one parent to be the
better person to care for the child, but
also the basic facts which show why that
ultimate conclusion is justified. . . .
Proper findings of fact ensure that the
ultimate custody award follows logically
from, and is supported by, the evidence and
controlling legal principles. Adequate
findings are also necessary for this Court
to perform its assigned review function.
See also Shioii v. Shioii, 671 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1983)
(findings in divorce modification cases permit the aggrieved
party to properly challenge the modification and the appellate
court to properly review it). Findings may appear in an opinion
or memorandum decision, or may be stated orally and recorded in
open court. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Hansen v. Hansen,
736 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1989). Adequate findings are those that -(1) are
sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough facts to disclose the
process through which the ultimate conclusion is reached, (3)
indicate the process is logical and properly supported, and (4)
are not clearly erroneous.- Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199,
203 (Utah App. 1987). Unless the record meets this standard,
the issue of custody must be reversed. Id.
The trial court in this case made no findings in conjunction
with either the amendment of the divorce decree or the denial of
LaRae's petition. With respect to the amendment, the court
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demonstrated/ we are compelled to remand the case to the trial
court for entry of appropriate findings.3 Those findings
should articulate the considerations behind the initial award of
custody and the order denying modification/ and should reflect
the current legal standard for modification of custody.4
The order denying LaRae's petition to modify custody of the
two youngest children is vacated and the case is remanded for
entry of appropriate findings.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

3. Without such findings, for example, it is difficult to
distinguish Raymond's voluntary relinquishment of custody to
LaRae from the situation in Tuckey v. Tuckev, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah
1982) (change of circumstances shown where mother is temporarily
absent from state, leaving custody of children with
grandparents).
4. LaRae contends on appeal that she has demonstrated a
sufficient change of circumstances to justify a modification of
custody. Since we do not reach this issue, we have no occasion
to consider whether the trial court correctly applied the legal
standard as set forth in Elmer v. Elmer, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 37,
39-41 (1989); see also Mauqhan, 770 P.2d at 159-61.
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